«1 The background When Smith begins work on the speciﬁcs of natural wages and proﬁts, he has already set out his conception of “natural ...»
Smith on Natural Wages and Profits
(Chapters VIII and IX of The Wealth of Nations 1 )
1 The background
When Smith begins work on the speciﬁcs of natural wages and proﬁts, he has already set out his
conception of “natural price”: This is the price, for any given commodity, which yields a revenue
just suﬃcient to reward labor, stock and land at their “natural” rates. In this context, the natural
remuneration of the “factors of production” (to use a modern term, not found in Smith) simply means the ruling social average return. He has argued that natural price, so deﬁned, provides a “center of gravity” for actual market price. If the price of a commodity is above its natural level, it follows that the return to the factors must be above the natural or average rate. In that case we’d expect to see resources drawn into the production of the commodity in question: supply of the commodity will expand and price will fall, towards the natural level. If a price is below its natural level, the factors must be receiving below-average returns, so resources will tend to be withdrawn from the industry in question, supply will shrink, and market price will rise.
Smith holds that natural price is obtained by adding up the natural rewards to the factors of production.2 To deepen his theory of value, therefore, it is incumbent upon him to provide an account of what determines the natural rates of wages, proﬁt and rent—that is, what accounts for variations in the ruling social average of these returns, over historical time and between diﬀerent nations at a point in time. He begins with wages.
2 Natural wages Smith observes that in the struggle between “master” and employee, the masters typically have the upper hand, and will pay wages as low as they can manage (p. 169). Nonetheless there exists a ﬂoor below which the masters cannot long depress wages (p. 170). I’ll call this the “reproduction minimum”: it is the lowest (real) wage that permits the workforce both to survive and to reproduce over time, the lowest wage consistent with a stable size of labor force over the long run. If the masters push wages below this level they’re cutting their own throats.
Smith recognizes that wages are not always and everywhere restricted to the reproduction minimum: they can be substantially higher. What accounts for this? One might at ﬁrst suppose that wages would tend to be higher in wealthier economies, but Smith insists this is not so. Wages are high, he says, not in economies with the greatest wealth but rather in economies where the rate of increase in national wealth is greatest: “It is not the actual greatness of national wealth, but its continual increase, which occasions a rise in the wages of labour” (p. 172). The governing factor is not thelevel of economic development but its time-derivative. He at ﬁrst simply asserts this, then provides some evidence for his assertion (his comparison on pp. 172–3 between the Britain and North America of his day—Britain is richer but the increase of wealth is more rapid in America;
wages are higher in America). Finally he gives us (the elements of) a theoretical argument as to why this should be so. I will try to reconstruct this argument.
1 Pagesreferences are to the Penguin edition of The Wealth of Nations, ed. Andrew Skinner.
2 Notethat this is not the only possible perspective: one can, for instance, conceive of natural price as determined by the total direct and indirect labor-time required to produce a commodity, and to conceive of the rewards to the “factors” as a decomposition of natural price, rather than as independent magnitudes that are added up to yield natural price. This was David Ricardo’s view.
ˆ Let W denote the reproduction minimum wage. Smith postulates that the rate of increase of ˆ population is an increasing function of the wage, with a zero rate of increase corresponding to W.
I think we can take it that, as a ﬁrst approximation, he reckons the supply of labor forthcoming at any point in time is dependent only on demographics and not on the wage (that is, the short-run
labor supply curve is vertical). To capture this we can write:
Smith also argues that the increase in the aggregate demand for labor is governed by the rate of
accumulation of “stock” or capital. Let r denote this rate of accumulation, then:
Suppose we “start” with the labor market in equilibrium, with Ls = Ld. Maintenance of equilibrium then requires that ∆Ls = ∆Ld. Setting equations (1) and (2) equal, we have
If accumulation of stock were to cease, we’d have r = 0 and hence g(r) = 0. That implies ˆ ˆ that f (W − W ) = 0 too, but the only way to achieve that is by having W = W, i.e. the wage equals the reproduction minimum. Thus in a static society, regardless of the level of national wealth that has been achieved, the reproduction minimum seems to be the only wage level consistent with equilibrium in the labor market.
If on the other hand we have r 0, and hence g(r) 0, labor-market equilibrium requires that ˆ ˆ f (W − W ) 0, which implies that W W. The wage will stand above the minimum in a rapidly growing economy.
We can spell out the mechanism a bit more with reference to Figure 1. Start with the wage at ˆ W0, in excess of the reproduction minimum, and the short-run labor supply curve Ls. Since W W population will be increasing, and hence (with a time lag) so will the size of the labor force. The short-run labor supply curve therefore moves out towards Ls. This will tend to drive the wage down towards the reproduction minimum, irrespective of the level of national wealth, unless there is an oﬀsetting increase in labor demand (the shift from Ld to Ld. But this oﬀset will be present only in an economy where stock is increasing at a suﬃcient rate.
If Smith reckons there is a long-run tendency for accumulation to slow down as economies mature (and it seems he does), then his theory of the natural rate of wages has a rather pessimistic conclusion.
Things don’t look good for labor in the long run. Notice, however, the way in which the pessimistic result depends, crucially, on the postulate that population growth is an increasing function of the wage.
Consider the possibility that in the long run the rate of increase in population (and workforce) is inversely related to the general level of wages. With historical hindsight this does not seem to be far from the truth. In that case what happens if we “start” at some point with the happy situation of ˆ W W ? We will not see the automatic increase in Ls that Smith expected, and there’s no reason ˆ to expect the wage to be driven down to W, even if accumulation is slow or non-existent.
It’s worth noting that the idea of a long-run tendency for wages to be driven towards a reproduction minimum is not exclusive to Adam Smith; it’s part of the common currency of classical political economy. Other authors who envisaged such a tendency (for instance Malthus, Ricardo and Marx)
had somewhat diﬀerent arguments leading to this conclusion, however, so we can’t assume that by “disposing of” Smith’s argument we have totally undercut the grounds for classical pessimism on this score.
3 Natural proﬁts Exposition Right at the start of Chapter IX Smith gives us an idea of where he’s headed: accumulation of capital tends to lower the rate of proﬁt.
The increase of stock, which raises wages, tends to lower proﬁt. When the stocks of many rich merchants are turned into the same trade their mutual competition naturally tends to lower its proﬁt; and when there is a like increase of stock in all the diﬀerent trades carried on in the same society, the same competition must produce the same eﬀect in them all. (p. 190) This passage not only announces his theme; it also provides an argument as to why accumulation should lower proﬁt. This argument, I should say, is highly suspect. We’ll return to its problems shortly.
Smith next wants to try to illustrate his claim empirically. But here he faces an obstacle: it is very diﬃcult to measure the ruling rate of proﬁt in a given economy at a given phase of history.
He proposes to get around this by using a proxy measure, namely the rate of interest. It is a bit easier to get data on the rate of interest, and Smith argues that there ought to be a fair degree of correlation between the two variables, proﬁt and interest. If the interest rate is high, that indicates that people are willing to pay high interest on borrowed funds. We can infer that there must be highly proﬁtable real investment opportunities to make such borrowing worthwhile: the ruling rate of proﬁt is high. If the ruling interest rate is low, that says that people are not willing to pay high interest on borrowed funds, which would seem to indicate that the opportunities for proﬁt-making are limited, or the ruling rate of proﬁt is low. (There is a possible problem with this argument too;
again, we’ll return to it below.) On this basis Smith is able to provide some facts that, on the face of it, support the idea that the rate of proﬁt tends to fall as capital accumulates. For instance, he points out that there was a sustained trend fall in interest rates in England from the time of Henry VIII to his own day, a period over which “the wealth and revenue of the country have been continually advancing”, while as of the 1770s Holland, “a richer country than England”, had lower interest rates than England.3
Let’s examine the theoretical claim with which Smith begins. He’s saying that what applies at the micro level—namely, that “when the stocks of many rich merchants are turned into the same trade
their mutual competition naturally tends to lower its proﬁt”—applies equally at the macro level:
“when there is a like increase of stock in all the diﬀerent trades carried on in the same society, the same competition must produce the same eﬀect in them all.” But it’s not obvious that this should be so.
The “micro” mechanism to which Smith refers is nothing other than the mechanism that ensures convergence of market prices towards natural prices. If a particular trade is showing above-average proﬁt (market price above natural price) then capital will tend to ﬂood in, and competition among the suppliers will lower the price and lower the proﬁt. This is OK. Using a standard modern diagram, we can represent the idea in Figure 2.
We have an initial short-run equilibrium at price P0, but (let’s say) this price is above the natural 3 The low rate of proﬁt that tends to emerge as the national economy matures is not necessarily a very bad thing, Smith reckons. With a large stock of capital, the amount of proﬁt realized in a mature economy may be very substantial, even if the rate is low.
level. At capital enters the supply expands from S to S and the price falls to P1. Proﬁt will fall too.
Note, however, that we have implicitly assumed the demand curve for the product remains in its original position, at D. Clearly, if the demand curve were also to move outward (say, to D ), the expansion of supply would be consistent with the price remaining at P0.
Now my point is that the ceteris paribus assumption, that the demand curve does not move, is perfectly reasonable if we are doing micro analysis: if we’re analysing what’s going on in one particular “trade” or market in isolation. If the supply of pizza, or wristwatches, expands, there is no reason to suppose the demand for these items will expand at the same time. But this seems incoherent at the macro level: how can capital (‘stock’) be expanding in the aggregate, yet there’s no change in demand? As capital expands there will be a greater demand for labor (Smith made this point earlier) so presumably there will be more people employed and/or higher wages. So, in modern parlance, consumers’ incomes will increase and the demand for consumer products will expand. Besides, the expansion of capital and supply means that capitalists will be demanding more non-labor inputs: the demand for “producer goods” must also be expanding. Smith’s argument seems fallacious: what applies at the micro level need not (in this case, cannot) apply at the macro level.